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NOTE
The Unappealing Nature of Guilty Plea
Agreements: Johnson’s Restrictions on
Appeals of Intellectual Disabilities
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Alexander M. Brown*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Ronald Johnson was charged with the murder of Luke Meiners,
a St. Louis attorney.1 On the advice of his appointed defense counsel, Johnson
pleaded guilty to the charge of first-degree murder to avoid the death penalty.2
Johnson was ineligible, however, for the death penalty because he was
intellectually disabled.3 After his conviction, Johnson appealed for postconviction relief.4 Johnson received a mental evaluation, which concluded he
was competent to stand trial.5 Thus, the court upheld his guilty plea.6 In an
appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Johnson argued that his conviction
should be set aside because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and
was coerced into accepting his plea.7 The Supreme Court of Missouri avoided
the merits of Johnson’s appeal because of its technical deficiencies.8 The
court further confused the established standards for competency to stand trial
and intellectual disability in a way that will affect the rights of intellectually
disabled individuals.9
Part II of this Note examines the pertinent facts and holding of the case.
Part III analyzes the legal standards for competency to stand trial, the death
penalty in relation to intellectual disability, and claims of ineffective
*

B.A., William Woods University Fulton-Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University
of Missouri School of Law, 2021; Lead Article Editor, Missouri Law Review.
1. Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 899.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 899–900.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 908.
9. Id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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assistance of counsel. Finally, Part IV considers how the court’s rulings in
this case caused injustice to Ronald Johnson and how it will affect the pleabargaining process for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Missouri
moving forward.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ronald Johnson was diagnosed with mild mental retardation at ten years
old when he was found to have an Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) of fifty-three.10
For the rest of his school career, he was in special education classes until he
dropped out in the tenth grade.11 Additionally, Johnson suffered from a
seizure disorder and developed schizophrenia, which caused hallucinations
for which he was repeatedly hospitalized and placed on disability.12 Johnson
began a long-term romantic relationship with a man named Cleophus King in
his late teens.13 In 2008, Johnson and King were charged with murder in St.
Louis, Missouri.14 Johnson and his accomplice were recorded on audio killing
a local attorney, a friend of Johnson, and then robbing the victim.15 The State
offered not to pursue the death penalty if Johnson would agree to plead guilty
to the murder.16 Johnson’s counsel advised him to accept the State’s offer
because the evidence against him was strong, and the violent nature of the
crime would have been damaging at trial.17 Johnson accepted the plea
agreement.18 At the plea hearing, Johnson affirmed that he had discussed the
case with his attorney, understood the charges, and desired to plead guilty.19
Johnson further affirmed that he did not have any mental disability that would
affect his participation in his defense or his understanding of the proceedings

10. Appellant’s Substitute Statement, Brief and Argument at 20, Johnson v.
State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (No. SC97330).
11. Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 5.
12. Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 34.
13. Appellant’s Substitute Statement, supra note 10 at 5.
14. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 895.
15. Id. The attorney, Luke Meiners, had befriended Johnson, age 25. Johnson
and his lover/accomplice Cleophus King conspired to rob Meiners. On the night of
the murder, Johnson asked Meiners for a ride to King’s house so he could do laundry.
Once they arrived, Johnson and King attempted to rob Meiners, who resisted. Over
the course of a fourteen-minute struggle, Johnson and King beat, stabbed, and
ultimately strangled Meiners to death. The two then stole cash and electronics from
Meiners before using his Jeep to dump his body. Jennifer Mann, Man who admitted
killing St. Louis County Lawyer gets life without parole, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
(March 22, 2013), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-whoadmitted-killing-st-louis-county-lawyer-gets-life/article_0f13770d-442c-5719-ab369b4530d1152a.html [https://perma.cc/LH2S-D6TK].
16. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 898.
17. The State was in possession of a recording of the murder. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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and that he understood the guilty plea would forfeit any rights to trial.20 After
these affirmations, the State provided this factual basis to support Johnson’s
guilty plea:
Judge, had this matter gone to trial, the state would have proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, with readily available witnesses and
competent evidence that between March 6, 2008, and March 8, 2008,
here in the City of St. Louis, specifically at the home of Cleophus King
at 5726 Waterman, [Johnson], acting with Cleophus King, knowingly
caused the death of [Victim], a friend and acquaintance of [Johnson],
that they caused [Victim’s] death by strangling, stabbing, and beating
him, and that they used a knife, multiple knives, weapons, and an
extension cord on [Victim]. In the course of that, that [Johnson], acting
with Cleophus King, stole and robbed [Victim] of his wallet, keys to
his jeep, and that they subsequently went and took those items and the
victim’s jeep and used the victim’s credit cards contained within his
wallet to purchase items. And that after killing [Victim] that night, they
took his body, wrapped him up and dumped him over in Illinois.21

Johnson affirmed the facts as recited by the State and his satisfaction
with his counsel’s performance and denied that any threats were made to
induce his guilty plea.22 The circuit court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and
imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole, as recommended in
the plea agreement.23
Johnson then filed a motion for post-conviction relief and raised three
issues at his post-conviction relief hearing.24 First, Johnson claimed that he
was illegally coerced into accepting his plea deal because the State threatened
him with death, despite the fact that his intellectual disability precluded him
from receiving that sentence.25 Second, Johnson alleged he was not
competent to plead guilty and will never be competent.26 Third, Johnson
argued that his counsel was ineffective because his attorney failed to request
an independent competency evaluation to which he was entitled.27 Johnson
introduced evidence regarding his low IQ and the “threats” of the death
penalty made by his plea.28
Additionally, Johnson blamed his counsel for failing to challenge the
State’s competency evaluation by not seeking an independent evaluation.29
20. Id.
21. Id. at 899.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Johnson was threatened by the possibility of the death penalty as a
sentence. Id.
29. Id.
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Johnson’s counsel testified that, although he realized Johnson was “slow,” he
did not know that Johnson had an intellectual disability.30 Johnson’s attorney
also denied threatening or encouraging Johnson to accept the plea
agreement.31 Rather, Johnson’s plea counsel testified that Johnson made his
decision to accept the plea agreement after discussing it with his family.32 The
court rejected Johnson’s allegations that he was threatened by his plea counsel
and overruled Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief.33 Johnson
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered transfer.34
Johnson appealed his sentence on the grounds that he was coerced into
accepting the State’s plea agreement,35 he was not competent to plead guilty,36
and his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s
competency evaluation and failing to seek a second competency evaluation.37
The majority opinion, written by Judge W. Brent Powell, agreed with the trial
court that (1) Johnson was not coerced into accepting the State’s plea
agreement, (2) Johnson was competent to stand trial, and (3) Johnson’s plea
counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a second competency
evaluation.38 Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.39
The dissent, written by Judge Laura Denver Stith, found that (1) Johnson
was coerced, (2) even if competent to stand trial, he was not eligible for the
death penalty, and (3) his plea counsel was ineffective.40 In particular, the
dissent found that the evidence presented to the trial court showed that
Johnson was intellectually disabled, that this intellectual disability made him
incompetent to accept a plea agreement, and that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate the extent of his intellectual disability.41 Judge Stith
would have reversed the judgment of the motion court and either remanded
the case for trial or held an evidentiary hearing to determine the issue of
intellectual disability.42

30. Id. at 900.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The transfer was ordered pursuant to MO. R. CIV. P. 83.04. Id.
35. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 900.
36. Id. at 904.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 902, 904. Because this was an appeal from a Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035
motion for postconviction relief from a guilty plea decided by a motion court as the
factfinder, the Court reviewed the appeal on a “clearly erroneous” standard. Id. at 900
(citing Latham v. State, 554 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)).
39. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 908.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 914–21, 923–24.
42. Id. at 928.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issues surrounding intellectual disability, competency, the death
penalty, and ineffective assistance of counsel are complex. When these
problems are combined with a plea agreement, the analysis becomes even
more complicated. To understand how the law has developed around each of
these issues, it is important to examine them individually. First, this Part
examines Missouri competency law and explains its development in state and
federal law. Next, this Part examines the Supreme Court of the United States
cases and Missouri cases addressing death penalty issues in similar contexts.
Finally, this Part examines the law regarding claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

A. Competency to Stand Trial
To understand the history of the death penalty and the state of the law it
is first essential to understand the role competency plays in determining the
efficacy of a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Missouri has defined
competency to stand trial as “[the] defendant [having] the sufficient ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
and having a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.”43 The standards for competency to stand trial are codified by
statute.44 This statute proscribes conviction or sentencing of any individual
who does not have the capacity to understand the trial process or adequately
assist in his or her defense.45 When a judge has reason to believe that a
defendant lacks capacity, or a motion is filed by either party, the court is
required to order an examination to determine the issue. 46 Failure of a judge
to order an examination to determine competency has been held by the
Supreme Court of the United States to be a violation of a defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair trial.47 In Missouri, if neither party requests a
second examination, the court may make a finding of competency based on
the report of the examiner or impanel a jury of six to make a finding of fact
on the issue.48 Upon a finding that an individual is incompetent to stand trial,
the court is required to suspend the criminal proceedings and commit the
individual to the Department of Mental Health.49

43. State v. Baumruk, 85 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
44. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.1 (2019).
45. Id.
46. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.2 (2019).
47. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375 (1966)).
48. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.7 (2019).
49. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.9 (2019).
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In the event that incompetency is established before a plea, the
incompetent individual is also found to be incompetent to plead guilty.50 A
defendant is presumed to be competent, and the burden of showing
incompetency is on the defendant.51 A presumption of incompetency cannot
be created, even if some evidence exists that a defendant suffers from an
intellectual disability.52 Although defense counsel is allowed to request a
second examination to determine competency, counsel is not ineffective for
deciding not to request a second evaluation.53 This presumption of
competency has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
multiple decisions.54 The only exception to this general rule regarding
competency is if a mental evaluation report appears deficient or a nonreported mental defect becomes apparent to defense counsel. In that case,
counsel is compelled to seek a further evaluation.55 Rather, sufficient
evidence of an intellectual disability is only enough to compel defense counsel
to seek a second mental evaluation.56 A mental defect that would trigger this
exception is evidence of an intellectual disability.57
The applicable Missouri statute gives a three-prong test to determine
whether an individual suffers from an intellectual disability.58 The individual
must display: (1) a subaverage IQ; (2) extensive deficits in adaptive behaviors
50. Hubbard v. State, 31 S.W.3d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the trial
court’s findings regarding competency of defendant to plead guilty were not clearly
erroneous because they were based on a sufficient medical report).
51. MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020.8 (2019).
52. Baird v. State, 906 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
53. Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 30 n.6 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); see also
Bass v. State, 950 S.W.2d 940, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing multiple cases
with this holding).
54. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“If a defendant is
incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial until
such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense
and understand the proceedings against him.”); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
480 (1960) (per curiam).
55. Gooden v. State, 846 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Mo. 1989) (en banc)) (“Absent a perceived
shortcoming in a mental evaluation report or a manifestation of a mental disease or
defect not identified by a prior report, an attorney representing a defendant in a
criminal case is not compelled to seek further evaluation.”).
56. Id.
57. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1 (2019).
58. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6 (2019) (stating “a condition involving
substantial limitations in general functioning characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related deficits and
limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors … which conditions are manifested and
documented before eighteen years of age.”). State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 153
(Mo. 2008) (en banc) (“According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders IV (DSM—IV), a person with an I.Q. of 70 or lower has significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, but it is possible for an individual with an I.Q.
between 70 and 75 to be diagnosed as mentally retarded ….”).
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that stem from his or her subaverage IQ; and (3) both of the prior prongs must
have manifested and been documented before the individual reached eighteen
years of age.59 The Supreme Court of Missouri has adopted these standards
for determining intellectual disability from the medical community.60
In Goodwin v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed which
types of evidence are sufficient to show that an individual suffers from an
intellectual disability.61 The court examined the language of the applicable
statute, which requires “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” as
that term is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM-IV”).62 Analyzing the DSM-IV, the court found that IQ
tests are the standard procedure for determining whether an individual suffers
from an intellectual disability.63 Using this standard, the Goodwin court found
that the defendant did not meet the standard for “intellectually disabled,”
although his IQ was in the mid-seventies to eighties.64 Because Goodwin was
not “intellectually disabled,” the court did not consider the second prong of
the statute’s test.65
While the Goodwin court found the defendant’s IQ score too high to be
considered intellectually disabled, the court has found slightly lower scores to
meet the standard.66 Although evidence establishing an intellectual disability
creates a duty on the part of defense counsel to move for a second mental
evaluation, intellectual disabilities do not automatically make a defendant

59. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 153.
60. See Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 30–31 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
61. Id. at 26.
62. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6; Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 30 (Mo. 2006) (en
banc). DSM-IV is the abbreviation for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV of
the American Psychiatric Association. This manual contains the standards for
defining psychological disorders in the United States medical community and was
updated in 2013 to the DSM-V. CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND
QUALITY, 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: DSM-5 Changes:
Implications for Child Serious Emotional Disturbance, June 2016,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK519708/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK519708.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW9G-L9KX].
63. Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 30 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
64. Id. at 31.
65. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.6; Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 31 (Mo. 2006) (en
banc) (“Without evidence that Goodwin’s intellectual functioning is ‘significantly
subaverage,’ there is no need to move on to a discussion of his adaptive behaviors.”);
but see Goodwin, 191 S.W.3d at 31 n.7 (recognizing that IQ test scores are not applied
mechanically because IQ scores are only one part of the statutory definition).
66. W.J.K. v. K.S.G. (In the Interest of T.T.G.), 530 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Mo. 2017)
(en banc) (finding an IQ score of 65 sufficient to indicate an intellectual disability);
State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding
an IQ between 65 and 70 to establish an intellectual disability).
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incompetent to stand trial.67 However, a finding of intellectual disability or
defect does make an individual ineligible for the death penalty.68

B. Death Penalty
Application of the death penalty to intellectually disabled individuals has
been declared unconstitutional since the Supreme Court of the United States’s
decision in Atkins v. Virginia.69 The Court came to that decision by
considering whether the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.70 The ruling was codified in
Missouri Revised Statute Section 565.030.1, which states, “Where murder in
the first degree is charged but not submitted or where the state waives the
death penalty, the submission to the trier and all subsequent proceedings in
the case shall proceed as in all other criminal cases.”71 The statute further
states that the trier of fact must determine by a preponderance of the evidence
whether the defendant is intellectually disabled, with the defendant carrying
the burden of proof.72 Importantly, these rules apply only during the trial
process, and the jury makes a finding of intellectual of disability under these
rules.73 The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that prior to a trial for
murder, the court is not required to determine whether the defendant has an
intellectual disability unless there is a question as to the defendant’s
competence to stand trial, even when the defendant is facing the possibility of
the death penalty.74

67. State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (“The standard
for determining a defendant’s competence to plead guilty is essentially the same as
that for determining if a defendant is competent to proceed to trial.”); see also Wilson
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 1991) (“Some degree of intellectual disability
does not automatically render a defendant incapable of knowingly and voluntarily
pleading guilty.”); Bryant v. State, 563 S.W.2d 37, 46 (Mo. 1978) (holding that a
defendant can be found competent to stand trial while suffering from a mental disease
or defect); Pulliam v. State, 480 S.W.2d 896, 904 (Mo. 1972); Evans v. State, 467
S.W.2d 920, 923 (Mo. 1971); State v. Lowe, 442 S.W.2d 525, 529–30 (Mo. 1969).
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
69. Id. at 321 (holding that the death penalty is excessive punishment for
individuals with intellectual disabilities and the U.S. Constitution “places a
substantive restriction on a state’s power to take the life” of an intellectually disabled
offender).
70. Id. at 352.
71. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1.
72. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(1).
73. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.1.
74. Davis v. State, 517 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. 1974) (en banc). Although this
decision occurred before the Supreme Court of the United States declared the death
penalty unconstitutional for individuals with intellectual disabilities, subsequent
appellate decisions have upheld it. See Cole v. State, 218 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007).
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Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has found that the
threat of the death penalty during plea agreements does not violate any
constitutional rights of the defendant because it is not coercive.75 The
Supreme Court of Missouri adopted and expanded upon this ruling.76 The
court has repeatedly found that to prove a defendant was coerced into pleading
guilty, he or she must show that his or her counsel gave ineffective advice or
misled him or her as to the nature of the case.77 Thus, in determining whether
a defendant has been coerced into pleading guilty to a crime, it is essential to
analyze the elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show “(1) counsel’s performance did not conform to the
degree of skill, care[,] and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and[,]
(2) he was thereby prejudiced.”78 If the movant is unable to prove one element
of the test then the court need not consider the other element.79 While this
general rule remains the same for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
that arise from a guilty plea,80 the Supreme Court of Missouri has changed the
focus of the factual analysis.81 When an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim arises following a guilty plea, the defendant must show that, but for
counsel’s actions, he or she would have insisted on going to trial and refused
to plead guilty.82

75. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (holding the mere fact that
appellee would not have pleaded guilty, except for the opportunity to limit the possible
penalty, did not show that the plea had not resulted from a free and rational choice –
especially where appellee was represented by competent counsel who advised the plea
would be to appellee’s advantage due to the great weight of the evidence against him);
see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Jackson v. State, 585
S.W.2d 495, 497 n.2 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (“a threatening [potential punishment] is
insufficient to render [a] plea involuntary.”); Rice v. State, 585 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo.
1979) (en banc); Burks v. State, 490 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Mo. 1973).
76. Beeman v. State, 502 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Mo. 1973); Richardson v. State, 470
S.W. 2d 479, 484 (Mo. 1971); Wilson v. State, 459 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. 1970).
77. Beeman, 502 S.W.2d at 256; Richardson, 470 S.W. 2d at 484; Wilson, 459
S.W.2d at 301.
78. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
79. Johnson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
80. Boyd v. State, 205 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Cupp v.
State, 935 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)) (“To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel where a movant has entered a plea of guilty, a ‘movant must
show his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that, as a result, he was prejudiced.’”).
81. Cupp, 935 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
82. Id.; Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
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In Cooper v. State, the defendant’s counsel advised him to plead guilty
to charges of theft totaling over $500.83 During the plea hearing, the defendant
repeatedly stated he was making the plea voluntarily and of his own free
will.84 After this hearing, the defendant waived his right for post-conviction
relief in exchange for a reduced sentence of probation.85 When the defendant
later violated the terms of his probation, he brought an appeal claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s recommendation to
plead guilty.86 In analyzing his claim, the court looked first to the general rule
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.87 The court held that, because
the claim arose from a guilty plea, “any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is immaterial to the extent that it impinges upon the voluntariness and
knowledge with which the plea was made.”88 Based on this analysis, and the
defendant’s statement in his plea hearing that he was making the plea
voluntarily, the court rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.89
After Cooper, Missouri courts must focus on the defendant’s knowledge
of the plea terms and the voluntariness of the plea.90 Additionally, Cooper
indicates that evidence of knowledge and voluntariness can be found from the
statements of the defendant during the plea hearing.91 While this standard of
analysis is straightforward in cases involving most defendants, the knowledge
portion of the analysis becomes more complex when the defendant suffers
from a mental disease or defect.92 An attorney can be found ineffective for
failing to investigate an alleged mental disease or defect if there is evidence
tending to show that the defendant suffered from a mental incapacity at the
time of his or her plea.93
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights are violated when an attorney fails
to investigate an alleged mental defect or disease.94 In Strickland v.
Washington, the Court stated that “[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations [of possible mitigating evidence] or to make a reasonable
decision that [such] investigations [are] unnecessary,”95 and the

83. Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 150.
84. Id. at 150–51.
85. Id. at 152.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 153 (citing State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. 1997) (en banc));
see also Matthews v. State, 501 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. 1973); Barylski v. State, 473
S.W.2d 399, 402 (Mo. 1971) (per curiam).
89. Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 157.
90. Id. (citing Roll, 942 S.W.2d at 375); see also Matthews, 501 S.W.2d at 47;
Barylski, 473 S.W.2d at 402.
91. Cooper, 356 S.W.3d at 155.
92. See Roll, 942 S.W.2d at 376.
93. Id.
94. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
95. Id.
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reasonableness of the investigation is “based on whether defense counsel’s
performance conformed to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a
reasonably competent attorney.”96 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to have
effective counsel in plea negotiations.97
Missouri appellate courts have held that a defendant’s counsel is not
ineffective for advising a defendant to take a plea agreement to avoid the death
penalty, even when he or she could be ineligible for the death penalty, unless
there is evidence showing that this was not a “reasonable strategy.”98
Appellate courts reviewing a claim that defense counsel or a trial court erred
in failing to move for a mental evaluation prior to a guilty plea are governed
by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035.99 This rule sets the standard of
review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as clearly erroneous.100
This means the appellate court must accept the lower court’s finding of facts
unless there is clear evidence of a mistake.101

96. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).
97. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that failure to inform a
defendant of a plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); see Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that failure to inform a defendant of the
potential immigration consequences of a plea agreement constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel).
98. Thurman v. State, 424 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (holding
defendant’s counsel was not ineffective because counsel’s advice to plead guilty to
remove the death sentence as a possible punishment was a reasonable strategy). Even
if defendant obtained a pre-trial determination that he suffered from mental retardation
under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030, life imprisonment without probation or parole was
the only sentence available under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020. Id. See also Baird v.
State, 906 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding counsel was not ineffective
for failure to request another mental examination to determine mental competence
because counsel had nothing to put him on notice that defendant was mentally
incompetent).
99. MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(a) (“A person convicted of a felony on a plea of
guilty claiming that the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and
laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the
sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess
of the maximum sentence authorized by law may seek relief in the sentencing court
pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 24.035.”).
100. MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(k).
101. In addition to Rule 24.035, appellate review in Missouri is covered by Rule
84.04. This rule creates specific requirements for how an appeal should be structured.
MO. R. CIV. P. 84.04(d)–(e). Typically, if an issue is incorrectly raised by the parties
according the procedural requirements of this rule, it will not be considered by a
Missouri appellate court.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Johnson v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower
court’s ruling and held in favor of the State by one vote.102 It was a hotly
contested four-to-five decision. Judges Wilson, Russell, and Fischer joined
Judge Powell’s majority opinion, with Judge Stith dissenting, joined by Chief
Justice Draper and Judge Breckenridge.103 This Part analyzes the decision in
Johnson in two main parts: Subpart A reviews the majority and Subpart B
examines the dissent.

A. Majority
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Johnson alleged that: (1)
his counsel threatened him to plead guilty by telling him he would receive the
death penalty even though he was ineligible; (2) he was incompetent to plead
guilty; and (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second
competency evaluation.104 Because Johnson’s appeal arose out of a motion
for post-conviction relief, the court limited its review to a “clearly erroneous”
standard.105 In examining the first issue of whether Johnson was coerced into
accepting the State’s plea agreement, the majority’s analysis focused on the
standards for guilty plea coercion announced by the court in McMahon v. State
and Drew v. State.106 In McMahon, the court held that a guilty plea is not
coerced if it is “intelligently and voluntarily made.”107 Because Johnson
claimed that his attorney coerced him through the use of threats, the court
found the standard from Drew applicable.108 The majority found that the
record does not support any allegations that Johnson was threatened.109
Specifically, the majority focused on the fact that Johnson felt threatened
by his attorney’s statement that he would face the death penalty if he were to
go to trial.110 While Johnson characterized his counsel’s explanation of the
death penalty as threatening, counsel testified that he had simply explained
the possibility to Johnson.111 The majority deferred to the trial court’s finding

102. Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
103. Id. at 908.
104. Id. at 899.
105. Id. at 900.
106. Id. at 901 (citing Drew v. State, 436 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo. 1969));
McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
107. McMahon, 569 S.W.2d at 758.
108. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 901 (quoting Drew, 436 S.W.2d at 729) (explaining
that Johnson must show he was “induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by
misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false
or ill founded.”).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 902.
111. Id. at 924–25.
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that counsel’s testimony was credible.112 Citing multiple prior decisions, the
court found that informing a defendant of the possible punishments he might
face does not amount to coercion.113 Based on this analysis, the court held
that Johnson’s trial counsel had not coerced him into pleading guilty through
the use of a threat.114
Next, the court discussed Johnson’s second argument that his counsel
advised him he was eligible for the death penalty when he was, in fact,
ineligible.115 The majority acknowledged that had Johnson been found to be
intellectually disabled, he would have been ineligible for the death penalty
under the Supreme Court of the United States’s ruling in Atkins.116 Judge
Powell, however, pointed out that a finding of intellectual disability is not
automatic, but rather, must be determined by the factfinder, with the burden
of proof resting on the defendant.117 Thus, because no factfinder had yet
found Johnson to be intellectually disabled, his counsel was required to inform
him of the possibility of the death penalty.118 Moreover, because the State
was not required to waive the death penalty, death was still “on the table” until
Johnson entered a guilty plea.119 The majority stressed that despite evidence
that Johnson may have been intellectually disabled, the jury may have rejected
such a finding.120 Although the court concluded that there was no clear error,
the majority did find that “Johnson’s counsel could have more fully
investigated Johnson’s intellectual capacity and advised Johnson of this
defense, any additional investigation or advice by counsel bears no direct
correlation to Johnson’s decision to accept the State’s offer and plead
guilty.”121
After settling the issue of intellectual disability, the majority next
addressed Johnson’s argument that he was incompetent to plead guilty.122 The
majority first considered the evidence presented by Johnson at his postconviction motion hearing that “he had an IQ of 63,” and “while . . . capable
of conversing with his attorney, he did not possess the intellectual capacity to
meaningfully assist his attorney in his defense.”123 However, the court again
deferred to the testimony of Johnson’s plea counsel, who stated that

112. Id. at 901.
113. Id. (citing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 406 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc)); see also Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2; Rice, 585 S.W.2d at 493; Burks,
490 S.W.2d at 35.
114. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 901.
115. Id. at 902.
116. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, (2002)).
117. Id. at 902–03 (citing State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. 2008) (en
banc)).
118. Id. at 903.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 907.
121. Id. at 903.
122. Id. at 904.
123. Id.
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“[Johnson] was able to repeat and rephrase information . . . demonstrating
[that he] understood the nature of the proceedings and could assist in his
defense.”124 In addition to this, the majority pointed out that a competency
exam conducted pursuant to Section 552.020 concluded Johnson was
competent to stand trial.125 The majority found the weight of the evidence
indicated that Johnson was competent to enter a guilty plea.126
Next, the majority turned to the last issue Johnson raised on appeal,
whether his plea counsel was ineffective for declining to seek a second
competency evaluation.127 Citing the relevant statute, the majority reiterated
that determining competency is a preliminary question for the judge to
address.128 The majority found that, although a second evaluation of
competency is allowed, defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to request
a second exam when there are no other extenuating factors.129 In Johnson’s
case, there had been a competency evaluation performed pursuant to Section
552.020 in which Doctor Armour “. . . concluded Johnson did not suffer any
mental disease or defect and that he was not intellectually disabled to an extent
that limited his ability to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his own defense.”130 In addition to this, at his post-conviction motion
hearing, Johnson’s plea counsel had testified that he was capable of
participating in his defense.131 The majority held these facts show there were
no extenuating circumstances that would have required Johnson’s plea
counsel to seek a second competency evaluation.132 The majority affirmed

the denial of post-conviction relief for three reasons. First, the
motion court found that Johnson’s plea counsel was not ineffective
for failing to request a second competency examination. Second,
Johnson’s plea counsel believed he was competent to stand trial.
Third, an experienced psychologist evaluated Johnson and found
him to be competent..133

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 552.020 (2019)).
129. Id. at 905.
130. Id. (emphasis added). In this instance, the court’s assertion that Dr. Armour
found Johnson not to be intellectually disabled when, in the prior section of the
opinion, the court explicitly stated that intellectual disability is a question that is to be
determined by the fact finder, points to a confusion of the standards for competence
and intellectual disability. See id. at 903, 905. Furthermore, Judge Stith’s dissent
pointed out that Dr. Armour did find that Johnson suffered from “mild mental
retardation” in his report. Id. at 922.
131. Id. at 905.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 905–06.
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B. Dissent
In her dissent, Judge Stith asserted that the majority opinion failed to
analyze the merits of the case because it did not address all the issues raised
in Johnson’s appeal.134 In its first point of analysis, the dissent argued that
Johnson successfully preserved the issue that his counsel failed to inform him
of an intellectual disability defense.135 The dissent found that the arguments
raised by Johnson in the post-conviction relief hearing were sufficient to
preserve the argument for appellate review.136 Thus, the dissent established
that Johnson had preserved his claim on appeal, or that the court was allowed
to look past the point relied on and decide the case on the merits.137 The
dissent next argued that the majority opinion misunderstood the difference
between intellectual disability and competency to stand trial.138
At the time of Johnson’s plea, the Supreme Court of the United States
and the Supreme Court of Missouri had held that an incompetent person could
not go to trial or be convicted.139 Competency is described as an individual
having sufficient ability to consult with counsel.140 Intellectual disability is
based on clinical standards and disqualifies an individual from receiving the
death penalty.141 Competency is governed by state laws, but the Supreme
Court has held that states are limited by clinical guidance in determining there
definition of intellectual disability..142 The determinations of competency and
intellectual disability are made by the court and based on separate types of
evidence.143 Although definitionally and functionally different, these two
concepts may overlap.144 The evidence Johnson offered at his post-conviction
relief hearing showed that Johnson’s IQ was between fifty-three and sixty-

134. Id. at 908 (Stith, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 909–10.
136. Id. at 912. The dissent justified its finding that Johnson’s argument is
preserved for review by citing relevant case law and language found in MO. R. CRIM.
P. 24.035(k). Id. at 910 (citing MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.035(k)). The dissent claimed the
issue should have been examined by the court even if not raised or preserved because
Rule 84.12(c) allows the court to review an issue under the plain error standard
discretionarily. Id. at 913 (citing MO. SUP CT. R. 84.13(c)). However, the majority
addressed Judge Stith’s analysis and found no reason to read past the issue raised in
the appellate brief because no argument was readily apparent. Id. at 906–08 (majority
opinion). The argument based on appellate procedure will not be further discussed as
it is outside the scope of this note.
137. Id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. See id. (citing State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 507 (Mo. 1994) (en banc));
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
140. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 914 (citing State, 879 S.W.2d at 507).
141. Id. at 902 (majority opinion) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318).
142. Id. at 916 (Stith, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 914–17.
144. Id. at 914.
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three.145 The dissent concluded that he met the definition of “intellectually
disabled” under Missouri case law, and that his counsel, apparently ignorant
of the law, only moved for a finding of incompetency.146
In addition to this, both Dr. Armour and Dr. Fucetola diagnosed Johnson
with “mild mental retardation” in addition to multiple non-adaptive
behaviors.147 Because these findings – when viewed in light of Missouri case
law – show that a factfinder would have likely found Johnson to be
intellectually disabled, the dissent found that the majority opinion and the
post-conviction relief court used the wrong test for assessing counsel’s
mishandling of intellectual disability issues.148 Judge Stith concluded that the
findings of the post-conviction relief court regarding Johnson’s intellectual
disability were clearly erroneous.149
Finally, the dissent examined the record regarding the plea counsel’s
understanding of intellectual disability.150 The dissent noted that Johnson’s
plea counsel is on record as using the terms “competency” and “intellectual
disability” interchangeably.151 His interchangeable use of the terms indicates
that he did not understand what “intellectual disability” means.152 The dissent
further state that because plea counsel did not understand the significance of
Johnson’s intellectual disability, he did not properly advise Johnson about the
defense of intellectual disability to the death penalty.153 Therefore, Johnson
was misinformed and coerced into accepting a life sentence through his plea
counsel’s failure to completely inform him of a possible defense to the death
penalty.154 Had Johnson been properly informed, he would not have pleaded
guilty and, therefore, he was prejudiced by counsel’s inept performance.155
Based on these findings, the dissent concluded that the court should sustain
Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, vacate his sentence to life without the possibility of
parole, and grant him a new trial, or alternatively, remand for a new
evidentiary hearing.156

145. Id. at 908.
146. Id. at 909, 919.
147. Dr. Armour made this finding during his initial competency evaluation, and
Dr. Fucetola later made the same finding during the admission of post-trial evidence.
Id. at 917. The dissent asserted that these two facts could be found in the postconviction plea hearing record. Id. at 917–19.
148. Id. at 919.
149. Id. at 909.
150. Id. at 921–23.
151. Id. at 921.
152. Id. at 922–23.
153. Id. at 923–24.
154. Id. at 924.
155. Id. at 925–26.
156. Id. at 928.
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V. COMMENT
The majority’s holding in Johnson condemns an intellectually disabled
defendant to a life sentence without parole – a sentence he did not deserve.157
The majority in Johnson held that an individual can only be found
intellectually disabled by a factfinder during trial.158 In effect, this subjects a
person who is truly intellectually disabled to the death penalty unless he or
she decides to take the case to trial and allow a factfinder to determine the
issue.159 While the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the threat
of the death penalty during plea negotiations is not unduly coercive,160 it has
also held that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel during plea negotiations.161 The majority’s decision fails to follow
the Sixth Amendment’s requirements given by the Supreme Court of the
United States by finding Johnson’s attorney effective even when his testimony
indicated that he did not perceive Johnson to be intellectually disabled – even
though two separate experts found that he was – and he failed to investigate
any additional relevant law.162
The ruling in Johnson will have a negative effect on intellectually
disabled individuals in criminal proceedings by lowering the standard for
effective assistance of counsel for criminal defense attorneys and by changing
the nature of plea negotiations in Missouri criminal law. Subpart A of this
Part analyzes the inherent unfairness of this ruling to Ronald Johnson.
Subpart B looks at the effect this ruling will have on the law in Missouri
regarding individuals with intellectual disabilities.

A. The Court’s Ruling in Johnson Creates Dangerous Precedent for
Proving Intellectual Disability
The court’s interpretation for the requirements of proving intellectual
disability creates an illogical burden on intellectually disabled individuals
during the guilty plea stage. In Johnson, the court found that only a factfinder
can make a determination of intellectual disability.163 Interpreting applicable
Missouri law, the court found that the burden of proof for intellectual

157. Id. at 928.
158. Id. at 902–03 (majority opinion).
159. Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at 150.); see also MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 565.005.1, 565.020.2.
160. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
161. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that failure to inform a
defendant of a plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); see Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that failure to inform a defendant of the
potential immigration consequences of a plea agreement constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel).
162. See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 906.
163. Id. at 902–03.
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disability is on the defendant.164 Thus, until a defendant proceeds to trial and
raises the issue of intellectual disability, and then receives a ruling on that
issue, he is not considered intellectually disabled.165 Because the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled executions of intellectually disabled
individuals unconstitutional, this leaves defense counsel whose client’s IQ is
on the margin of what constitutes an intellectual disability in a difficult
situation during plea negotiations.166 In cases like this one, where a
defendant’s IQ is well below the standard for intellectual disability, the
prosecutor’s coercive power is even more pronounced unless defense counsel
is required to investigate his or her client’s intellectual abilities or be
extremely well versed in the law.
The prosecutor can threaten the defendant with the death penalty unless
he or she pleads guilty, and defense counsel cannot convince the client that
the death penalty would not be allowed. This, in turn, provides an unfair
advantage to the prosecution in plea negotiations, where defense counsel are
already notoriously disadvantaged.167 If the prosecution knows or has reason
to know that a defendant is intellectually disabled, they can still push for the
death penalty.168 Defense counsel in this case must tell the client that he or
she might face the death penalty if he or she is not found to be intellectually
disabled. Although defense counsel with proper time and resources would
properly investigate, find evidence that the defendant does qualify as
intellectually disabled, and advise the defendant accordingly, a rushed or
overworked public defender might not. For most criminal defense attorneys
who already suffer from a lack of training when dealing with mentally
impaired defendants,169 this ruling requires more time and expense to provide
an adequate defense which only furthers a criminal defendant’s
disadvantages.170 Furthermore, because a finding of intellectual disability is
to be made by the court, in close cases, a defense counsel utilizing a costbenefit analysis would have to advise their client about the dangers of proving
intellectual disability versus taking the plea agreement. Thus, the prosecution
164. Id. at 903; see MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.005.1, 565.020.2.
165. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 903.
166. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 355 (holding that the death penalty is excessive
punishment for individuals with intellectual disabilities and the U.S. Constitution
places a substantive restriction on a state’s power to take the life of an intellectually
disabled offender).
167. Gregory G. Sarno, Adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal
client regarding plea bargaining, 8 A.L.R. 4TH 660 (Originally published in 1981,
updated weekly); Joseph L. Hoffman, Mary L. Kahn & Steven W. Fisher, Plea
Bargaining in The Shadow of Death, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001).
168. See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 903.
169. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the
Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 74 (1988).
170. See Evan G. Hall, The House Always Wins: Systemic Disadvantage for
Criminal Defendants and the Case against the Prosecutorial Veto, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 1717 (2017).
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gains the advantage of being able to use an inapplicable penalty to procure a
plea agreement when defense counsel is not aware of the law regarding
intellectual disability. While the court’s interpretation creates a paradox for
intellectually disabled individuals during the plea negotiation stage of a trial,
it also muddles the law of competency.
It is settled law in Missouri that a finding of intellectual disability does
not prevent a finding of competency to stand trial or plead guilty.171 In its
examination of the evidence of Johnson’s mental evaluation for competency,
the court deferred to the finding of the lower court that, although Johnson
produced evidence that he had an IQ of between fifty-three and sixty-three
and suffered from schizophrenia, a psychologist found him competent to stand
trial.172
This same psychologist, however, also made a finding that Johnson
would qualify as “mentally retarded” under the applicable medical diagnostic
criteria.173 Even so, the court found this evidence to apply only to a finding
of competency.174 While Johnson’s counsel reviewed enough of his client’s
records to determine that there may have been some question of his ability to
plead guilty, he had no knowledge of the implications of intellectual disability
or the possible defenses it could provide and failed to ask for a determination
on the issue.175 Not only did the majority opinion not consider this, but it
made an explicit finding that Johnson’s attorney’s testimony that he felt
Johnson was just “a little slow” was more persuasive than the medical reports
that Johnson offered to show his intellectual disability.176
By confusing the standards for competency and intellectual disability,
the court in Johnson established a system for analysis in Missouri in which a
defendant may be declared intellectually disabled but competent to plead
guilty and then also be required to go to trial to determine that he or she is, in
fact, intellectually disabled.177 This paradox could be prevented by allowing
a competency hearing to also function as a hearing on intellectual disability.
Alternatively, the rules should be changed to allow a judge to decide
intellectual disability before the beginning of the trial. In addition to
preventing this paradox, either of these options would also speed up the trial
process by allowing a finding on both issues in one hearing. While a single
hearing on both of these issues would require different types of evidence, the
experts used for either of these examinations would be proficient in providing
both. The fundamental problem in this case, however, is that Johnson’s
counsel was ignorant of the law regarding intellectual disability.178
171. See State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); Wilson v.
State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
172. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 904.
173. Id. at 917 (Stith, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 904 (majority opinion).
175. See id. at 919 (Stith, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 905, 909 (majority opinion).
177. See id. at 914 (Stith, J., dissenting).
178. See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 909 (majority opinion).
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By rejecting Johnson’s other claim on appeal that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a second competency evaluation, the court
creates a problematic precedent on two separate issues.179 Based on the plea
counsel’s testimony that he did not think Johnson was slow, the trial court
found counsel not ineffective.180 The majority then held that this ruling was
not clearly erroneous.181 Finding this evidence sufficient creates a dangerous
precedent for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that, when facing the death penalty, a defendant has a constitutional right
to expert testimony in determining whether they have an intellectual
disability.182 By accepting the testimony of Johnson’s attorney as sufficient
to show that he was ineffective, this constitutional standard is ignored.183
Second, in this case, there is evidence to show that counsel should have
reasonably suspected that Johnson was disabled and that he did not understand
the law regarding intellectual disability.184
These two issues create a precedent that not only ignores constitutional
law but allows courts to ignore the relevant facts of the case. This holding
places considerable difficulties on an appeal based on ineffective assistance
of counsel for intellectually disabled individuals because they will need to
overcome any statements of their prior counsel that they were competent.185
Additionally, allowing a finding that this kind of self-serving evidence is
persuasive encourages an attorney to lie, even if they know they have been
ineffective. This type of pressure on attorneys encourages them not only to
act unethically, but also to put their own professional well-being over the
freedom of a client.
Considering the findings of the court in Johnson, it is clear that
defendants with intellectual disabilities in Missouri must now overcome more
hurdles than ever before. First, a defendant’s counsel must engage in unfair
plea negotiations and advise their clients based on uncertainties in sentencing
that could mean life or death.186 Second, an intellectually disabled individual
must convince his or her counsel to request specific hearings into both
competency and intellectual disability, while hoping that the court is able to
discern a difference between the two.187 Third, if his or her counsel does fail
to request the proper hearings, an intellectually disabled individual must make
an exaggerated showing of his or her intellectual disability on appeal to prevail
in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, appellate attorneys
must be technically precise in their drafting of points relied on or, regardless

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 908.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 905–06.
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 723–24 (2014).
See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 900, 902.
See id. at 917–19 (Stith, J., dissenting).
See id. at 900, 902 (majority opinion).
See id. at 902–03.
See id. at 914, 920–21 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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of the merits or injustices of the case, the Supreme Court of Missouri will not
consider the issue.188

B. The Court’s Ruling in Johnson was Inherently Unfair to the
Defendant
The court’s ruling in Johnson is unfair because it misinterpreted,
misapplied, and ignored the relevant law, thereby denying Johnson the
opportunity to have his case heard on the merits. In Johnson’s first issue
raised on appeal, he claimed that he was coerced by his plea counsel into
pleading guilty by threat of death penalty.189 The majority analyzed this issue
on the basis that a plea bargain is valid as long as it was voluntarily and
intelligently made.190 While the court determined that, based on the evidence
provided at the post-conviction relief hearing by plea counsel, Johnson made
the plea voluntarily.191 However, their legal analysis of what constitutes
“voluntary” in giving a plea is flawed. In determining whether a plea
agreement is coercive, the court found that “the fact that the maximum
authorized punishment for a certain crime may be a threatening alternative in
itself does not render a plea involuntary.”192 Referring to prior decisions, the
court held that voluntariness of a plea cannot be attacked on a basis that the
defendant feared the death penalty.193 Thus, Johnson’s claim of coercion had
to fail because the death penalty was the maximum authorized punishment for
the crime of first-degree murder.194
While this analysis seems straightforward, the court’s flawed holding of
what evidence is required to prove that a defendant suffers from an intellectual
disability, as discussed above, changes the analysis. During Johnson’s two
mental evaluations for competency, both psychologists found Johnson to be
“mentally retarded.”195 Additionally, Johnson introduced evidence at his
post-conviction relief hearing that he had an IQ of between fifty-three and
sixty-three.196 Although the court refused to consider this evidence, it clearly
indicates that Johnson is intellectually disabled under Missouri case law.197
Because of this, Johnson would have been ineligible for the death penalty.198
188. See id. at 908.
189. Id. at 900.
190. Id. at 901.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2).
193. Id. at 902 (citing Jackson, 585 S.W.2d at 497 n.2).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 917 (Stith, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 908.
197. W.J.K., 530 S.W.3d at 496 (finding an IQ score of 65 sufficient to indicate
an intellectual disability); State ex rel. Lyons v. Lombardi, 303 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Mo.
2010) (en banc) (holding an IQ between 65 and 70 to establish an intellectual
disability).
198. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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Therefore, the death penalty would not have been the “maximum authorized
punishment.”199 Thus, when Johnson’s counsel told him that he was eligible
for the death penalty during the plea-bargaining process, it would have been
coercive.200
Additionally, even if the plea-bargaining process was not coercive, it
violated Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
The majority in this case failed to consider the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in relation to Johnson’s intellectual disability based on technical
failures of his appellate counsel.201 However, they admitted in their opinion
that Johnson’s plea counsel could have done more to investigate Johnson’s
potential intellectual disability.202 Moreover, there is ample evidence from
competency evaluations and plea counsel’s own testimony that he was
ignorant of the law regarding intellectual disability.203 Thus, by refusing to
consider the merits of the issue raised in the direct appeal because of a
technical deficiency, the majority violates Johnson’s constitutional rights.204
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that because the court
misinterpreted, misapplied, and ignored the relevant law, it incorrectly found
that Johnson’s appeal failed, thereby treating Johnson unfairly.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in Johnson substantially affects
the rights of the intellectually disabled in Missouri. By finding that Johnson,
a man who is undoubtedly intellectually disabled, did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to consider or advise him of a
diminished capacity offense or of his ability to use his disability as a defense
to the death penalty, the court lowered the standard of competency required
by defense counsel.205 While the evidence at his post-conviction hearing
clearly showed him to be intellectually disabled, the court focused instead on
the technical faults in his appellate brief and confused the law of competency
and intellectual disability to uphold the rulings of the lower courts.206 While
this particular decision affects only one man, its misstatement of law will
affect the intellectually disabled and their counsel for years to come.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
See Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 898, 901.
See id. at 908.
Id. at 903.
See id. at 909 (Stith, J., dissenting).
See id. at 908.
See id. at 903 (majority opinion); see also id. at 917–19 (Stith, J., dissenting).
See id. at 910, 914, 917–21 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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